@article{International:1474,
      recid = {1474},
      author = {Chapman, James},
      title = {Policy Coordination in an International Payment System},
      publisher = {Bank of Canada},
      address = {2008},
      pages = {1 online resource (iii, 29 pages)},
      abstract = {Given the increasing interdependence of both financial  systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a  vital question is what form should optimal policy take when  there are two connected payment systems with separate  regulators.

In this paper I show that two central banks  operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an  incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I  further show that this non-cooperative outcome will be  supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant  fixed exchange rate. This is in contrast to recent  research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday  interest rate will achieve a social optimum and that the  central bank has an incentive to achieve it.},
      url = {http://www.oar-rao.bank-banque-canada.ca/record/1474},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.34989/swp-2008-17},
}