@article{Settlement:1469,
      recid = {1469},
      author = {Chapman, James and Chiu, Jonathan and Molico, Miguel},
      title = {A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks},
      publisher = {Bank of Canada},
      address = {2008},
      pages = {1 online resource (iii, 40 pages)},
      abstract = {This paper develops a model of settlement system to study  the endogenous structure of settlement networks, and the  welfare consequences of clearing agent failure. The  equilibrium degree of tiering is endogenously determined by  the cost structure and the information structure. The  degree of tiering is decreasing in the fixed cost of  operating the second-tier network and the availability of  public credit history. Furthermore, the welfare effects of  clearing agent failure can be decomposed into operational  inefficiency and the loss of private information.},
      url = {http://www.oar-rao.bank-banque-canada.ca/record/1469},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.34989/swp-2008-12},
}